DRAFT — TEMPLATE FOR COUNSEL — NOT FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[NAMED PLAINTIFF 1], [NAMED PLAINTIFF 2], and [NAMED PLAINTIFF 3], individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GAVIN NEWSOM, in his official capacity as Governor of California; ROB BONTA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California; KAREN BASS, in her official capacity as Mayor of Los Angeles; [NAME], in [his/her] official capacity as Director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; [TOW OPERATOR(S)]; [AUTOMATED-ENFORCEMENT VENDOR(S)]; [COLLECTION CONTRACTOR(S)]; and DOES 1–100,
Defendants.
Case No. ____________
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: (1) Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Civil RICO); (2) Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO Conspiracy); (3) Forced Labor, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (Trafficking Victims Protection Act); (4) Deprivation of Due Process, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment); (5) Excessive Fines, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Eighth Amendment); (6) Unreasonable Seizure, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment); (7) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This is a class action on behalf of the people of California who have been made to pay fines, fees, penalties, tow and storage charges, and tax surcharges under threat of losing their registration, their license, their car, or their wages — before any hearing on the merits — and who have been made to labor to pay them.
2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, acting together through an association-in-fact enterprise, have for at least ten years operated a system of automated citation, registration holds, license suspensions, tows, impounds, and collections that takes the instruments of a person's livelihood and returns them only upon payment extracted through further labor. Plaintiffs allege that this system meets the definition of forced labor in 18 U.S.C. § 1589, which Congress has made racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), and that Defendants' conduct constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
3. Plaintiffs seek treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), compensatory and punitive damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
5. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) because Defendants reside, are found, or transact affairs in this District and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred here.
III. PARTIES
6. Plaintiff [NAME] is a resident of [CITY], California. On [DATE(S)], [he/she] [received an automated citation / had a registration hold placed / had a vehicle towed and impounded / had wages garnished] and paid $[AMOUNT] before any hearing on the merits. [Repeat for each named plaintiff. Attach receipts, notices, and DMV records as exhibits.]
7. Defendant Gavin Newsom is the Governor of California and is sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendant Rob Bonta is the Attorney General of California and is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Karen Bass is the Mayor of Los Angeles and is sued in her official capacity. Defendant [NAME] is the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles and is sued in [his/her] official capacity.
8. Defendant City of Los Angeles is a municipal corporation. Defendants [TOW OPERATOR(S)], [AUTOMATED-ENFORCEMENT VENDOR(S)], and [COLLECTION CONTRACTOR(S)] are private entities that, under contract with the State or the City, issue, process, enforce, or collect the exactions described below and retain a share of the proceeds. Does 1–100 are persons whose identities are presently unknown who participated in the conduct alleged.
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
9. The exactions. [Plead each tax, fee, fine, and surcharge with its enacting instrument and date — e.g., the automatic annual gasoline-excise adjustment; the extension of "temporary" income-tax brackets; local sales-tax increases; automated speed-camera citations authorized by AB 645 (2023); registration and license-renewal fees and penalties; tow, impound, and storage charges; collection fees and interest.]
10. The enforcement machine. Citations are generated by automated systems and license-plate readers; unpaid amounts trigger registration holds and license suspensions through interlocking databases; vehicles are towed and impounded and sold; unpaid balances are referred to collection and garnishment. Payment is demanded before any hearing on the merits, and in many instances a hearing is available only upon payment. [Plead specific instances, with dates and amounts, for each named plaintiff.]
11. Junk fees. [Plead the fees added to consumer bills by corporations under contract with or regulated by Defendants, and Defendants' enforcement choices with respect to them.]
12. The labor extracted. Each named plaintiff worked additional hours, took additional employment, or forwent necessities in order to pay the exactions and recover the instruments of his or her livelihood. [Plead hours, wages, and amounts for each named plaintiff.] Plaintiffs who could not pay were ordered to perform "community service," which is labor.
13. The coercion. Defendants obtained this labor and payment by threats of serious harm — the loss of the means of earning a living, the loss of shelter for those living in their vehicles, and the loss of liberty through suspension and impound — and by the abuse and threatened abuse of law and legal process, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2)–(4) and (c)(2).
14. The mails and wires. Defendants and their contractors mailed notices, demands, and threats of hold, suspension, and impound, and demanded and received payment through interstate wires, in furtherance of the scheme.
15. Retaliation. [Plead any act taken against a plaintiff or class member after complaining to officials, filing suit, or providing information to law enforcement, including signing the Declaration of Independence For Labor delivered to the United States Department of Justice.]
16. The toll. Peer-reviewed research associates long working hours with a nearly 20 percent increase in mortality risk and high job demands with a 35 percent increase in physician-diagnosed illness (Goh J, Pfeffer J, Zenios SA, The Relationship Between Workplace Stressors and Mortality and Health Costs in the United States, 62 Mgmt. Sci. 608 (2016), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2115); long working hours with a 44 percent increase in the odds of suicidal ideation, rising to 65 percent at 55 or more hours per week (Kim J et al., 50 Scand. J. Work Env't & Health 503 (2024), doi:10.5271/sjweh.4182, PMC11472300); 745,000 deaths worldwide in 2016 from ischemic heart disease and stroke attributable to long working hours (Pega F et al., 154 Env't Int'l 106595 (2021)); and a 33 percent higher risk of stroke at 55 or more hours per week (Kivimäki M et al., 386 Lancet 1739 (2015)). [Plead individual health and family consequences for named plaintiffs where applicable.]
V. THE ENTERPRISE AND THE PATTERN
17. The Enterprise. Defendants and their agents and contractors constitute an association-in-fact enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4): a group of persons associated together for the common purpose of generating, enforcing, and collecting the exactions described above and retaining the proceeds, with relationships among those associated, and with longevity sufficient to permit them to pursue that purpose.
18. Predicate acts. Defendants' conduct constitutes racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), including: forced labor and trafficking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590; extortion under color of official right and by wrongful use of fear of economic harm, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 [plead the misrepresentations — e.g., the characterization of taxes as temporary, of hearings as available, of fees as lawful]; and tampering with and retaliation against witnesses, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513.
19. Pattern. The predicate acts are related — sharing purpose, result, participants, victims, and method — and continuous, having occurred repeatedly over more than ten years and constituting the regular way in which the Enterprise conducts its affairs.
20. Injury. Plaintiffs and the class have been injured in their business and property by reason of the violations, including the amounts paid, the value of vehicles lost, wages garnished, and income lost.
VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
21. Plaintiffs bring this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of the following class: All persons who, from [DATE TEN YEARS BEFORE FILING] to the date of judgment, paid a fine, fee, penalty, tow or storage charge, collection charge, or tax surcharge to Defendants or their agents under threat of registration hold, license suspension, impound, or collection, before any hearing on the merits, or who performed labor in lieu of payment. [Define subclasses as needed — e.g., an Impound Subclass; a Vehicle-Dwelling Subclass; a Retaliation Subclass.]
22. Numerosity. The class numbers in the millions; joinder is impracticable.
23. Commonality. Common questions include whether the Enterprise exists; whether Defendants' conduct constitutes forced labor under § 1589; whether the exactions are collected before a meaningful hearing; whether the fines are excessive; and whether the class is entitled to damages and injunctive relief.
24. Typicality. The named plaintiffs' claims arise from the same system and the same conduct as the claims of the class.
25. Adequacy. The named plaintiffs have no conflicts with the class and have retained counsel experienced in class and RICO litigation.
26. Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole; and common questions predominate over individual questions, and a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I — Violation of 18 U. S.C. § 1962(c) (against the private contractor Defendants, the individual Defendants in their personal capacities as to damages, and Does 1–100). 27. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 28. Each such Defendant is a person employed by or associated with the Enterprise who conducted or participated in the conduct of its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 29. Plaintiffs and the class were injured in their business or property by reason of the violation and are entitled to treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
COUNT II — Violation of 18 U. S.C. § 1962(d) (same Defendants). 30. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 31. Each such Defendant agreed to the commission of the violations alleged in Count I.
COUNT III — Forced Labor, 18 U. S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (against all Defendants except the State officials in their official capacities as to damages). 32. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 33. Defendants knowingly obtained the labor and services of Plaintiffs and the class by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm, by the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process, and by a scheme intended to cause Plaintiffs to believe that failure to perform would result in serious harm; and Defendants knowingly benefited, financially and by receiving things of value, from participation in a venture they knew or should have known was engaged in such conduct. 34. Plaintiffs and the class are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). This claim is timely under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c).
COUNT IV — 42 U. S.C. § 1983, Fourteenth Amendment (Procedural Due Process) (against the City, the contractor Defendants, and the State officials for declaratory and injunctive relief). 35. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 36. Defendants, acting under color of state law and pursuant to official policy and custom, deprived Plaintiffs and the class of property — money, vehicles, licenses, and registrations — without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the deprivation.
COUNT V — 42 U. S.C. § 1983, Eighth Amendment (Excessive Fines) (same Defendants). 37. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 38. The fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed are grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offenses for which they are imposed. The Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT VI — 42 U. S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment (Unreasonable Seizure) (same Defendants). 39. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 40. The seizure and continued retention of class members' vehicles without a warrant, and after any justification for the initial seizure had ended, was unreasonable.
COUNT VII — Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 28 U. S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (against the State officials in their official capacities and the City). 41. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs. 42. An actual controversy exists. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the practices alleged are unlawful and an injunction prohibiting payment-before-hearing, registration holds and license suspensions for inability to pay, and impound without prompt post-seizure hearing.
VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class, pray for: (a) an order certifying the class and appointing Plaintiffs and their counsel to represent it; (b) a declaration that Defendants' practices are unlawful; (c) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as set out in Count VII; (d) treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); (e) compensatory and punitive damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (f) restitution and disgorgement; (g) attorneys' fees and costs under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c) and 1595(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988; (h) pre- and post-judgment interest; and (i) such other relief as the Court deems just.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims so triable.
Dated: ____________ Respectfully submitted,
____________________________
[ATTORNEY NAME], [BAR NO.]
[FIRM]
[ADDRESS] · [PHONE] · [EMAIL]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
DRAFTING NOTES FOR COUNSEL (delete before filing — every citation to be verified)
A. Sovereign immunity. A State and its officials in their official capacities are not "persons" under § 1983 for damages (Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)); plead official-capacity claims for prospective relief only (Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The City is liable under § 1983 for its policies and customs (Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Name private contractors and individuals in their personal capacities for damages.
B. Government entities and RICO. In the Ninth Circuit, municipal entities are not subject to RICO treble damages (Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)). Build the RICO counts around the private vendors, contractors, and individuals; treat the public bodies as the enterprise's instruments.
C. Tax Injunction Act and comity. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 bars federal courts from enjoining the assessment or collection of state taxes where a plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy exists; comity extends the bar (Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010)). Plead fines, fees, penalties, tow and storage charges, and collection charges as regulatory exactions rather than taxes; seek damages rather than injunctions against tax collection; and plead facts showing any state remedy is not plain, speedy, or efficient.
D. Section 1589 elements. Coercion must be by serious harm or threats of it, physical restraint, abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process, or a scheme causing belief of serious harm; "serious harm" includes financial harm sufficiently serious to compel a reasonable person to continue laboring (§ 1589(c)(2)). Plead the hold, suspension, impound, and collection threats as legal-process abuse, and the loss of shelter for vehicle-dwellers as serious harm. No court has adopted a percentage-of-income test; the two-percent line in the Declaration is a policy demand, not an element.
E. Limitations. Civil RICO: four years (Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)). TVPA: ten years (18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)). Section 1983 in California: two years, borrowed from Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1, with federal accrual rules.
F. Supporting authority to check. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019) (Excessive Fines Clause incorporated); Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017) (continued impound as a Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo.) (consent decree over a fine-and-fee system); Mackintosh v. Newsom, No. 2:26-cv-08508 (C.D. Cal.) (individual action pleading the same enterprise).
G. This template was prepared by a non-lawyer for use by counsel. It is not legal advice and creates no attorney-client relationship.